The nonstochastic multi-armed bandit problem, first studied by Auer, Cesa-Bianchi, Freund, and Schapire in 1995, is a game of repeatedly choosing one decision from a set of decisions ("experts"), under partial observation: In each round t, only the cost of the decision played is observable. A regret minimization algorithm plays this game while achieving sublinear regret relative to each decision. It is known that an adversary controlling the costs of the decisions can force the player a regret growing as t 1 2 in the time t. In this work, we propose the first algorithm for a countably infinite set of decisions, that achieves a regret upper bounded by O(t 1 2 +ε ), i.e. arbitrarily close to optimal order. To this aim, we build on the "follow the perturbed leader" principle, which dates back to work by Hannan in 1957. Our results hold against an adaptive adversary, for both the expected and high probability regret of the learner w.r.t. each decision. In the second part of the paper, we consider reactive problem settings, that is, situations where the learner's decisions impact on the future behaviour of the adversary, and a strong strategy can draw benefit from well chosen past actions. We present a variant of our regret minimization algorithm which has still regret of order at most t 1 2 +ε relative to such strong strategies, and even sublinear regret not exceeding O(t 4 5 ) w.r.t. the hypothetical (without external interference) performance of a strong strategy. We show how to combine the regret minimizer with a universal class of experts, given by the countable set of programs on some fixed universal Turing machine. This defines a universal learner with sublinear regret relative to any computable strategy.
Introduction
For the last 15 years, online regret minimization algorithms have played an important role in learning theory. The setup for online regret minimization is most easily and accurately formalized as a game between a learner and an adversary. The game proceeds in discrete time t = 1, 2, . . . , In each round t, the learner selects a decision from a set of possible decisions, while the adversary assigns costs to all possible decisions, both players without knowing the other's move. Then the learner's decision is revealed, and the learner incurs the corresponding cost.
A crucial issue which impacts on both the learner's algorithm and its achievable performance is what or how much does the learner observe. In the full information game, also widely known as "prediction with expert advice", decisions are also called experts, and the learner observes the costs of all experts. This enables him to play a randomized strategy that guarantees, with high probability, a performance almost as well as the best decision in hindsight. More precisely, there are algorithms that achieve a regret of order T log n at any horizon time T . Here, n is the (finite) number of available decisions, and regret is the difference between the learner's cumulative performance and the best expert in hindsight (after time T ) [19, 26, 10] . (The reader who is not familiar with expert algorithms at all, should see the references, but at least Sections 2.1 and 2.2 for a formal definition of regret.)
Games where the learner does not observe the full cost vectors are termed "partial observation". The most important and widely studied partial observation game is the so-called "bandit" setup, where in each round t, the learner observes just the cost of the decision played, not of the alternatives. In analogy to gambling slot machines, decisions are also called "arms of the bandit" in this setup. Bandits have an important motivation in and were originally considered for medical treatment, where different available treatments for a certain disease need to be explored, but on the other hand, it is highly desirable to apply successful treatments as often and others as rarely as possible. In this way, bandits are one of the most simple mathematical formalizations of an exploration vs. exploitation tradeoff. Much work has been done on stochastic bandits, i.e. situations where each arm obeys a stationary probability distribution [5] .
It may be surprising at a first glance that performance guarantees can be proved for adversarial bandits. The first respective result was shown by [2] , who proved that there is an algorithm such that after any time T , the regret of the learner w.r.t. each arm (however not the best arm in hindsight) is at most O( T n log n), with high probability, where again n is the finite number of arms. This bound is almost sharp, since the same authors show that an oblivious adversary (this is even weaker than an adaptive one, see Section 1.4) can force any learner a regret of Ω ( √ T n).
Results of this work
Most of the literature restricts to a finite number of decisions. In contrast, in this work we consider nonstochastic bandits with countably many arms. In this case, we cannot treat all arms equally, but we must introduce a prior: Each decision i, where they are enumerated i = 1, 2, . . . , is assigned with a prior weight w i , such that ∞ i=1 w i ≤ 1. (The reader may have noticed that we use the terms "decision", "expert", and "arm" interchangeably.) The following theorem is the main result of Section 2. 1 Theorem 1. Consider a nonstochastic bandit problem with countably many arms i = 1, 2, . . . , endowed with prior weights w i such that
The costs of the arms are controlled by an adaptive adversary. Then, for any ε > 0, there is an algorithm which achieves, for any time T and w.r.t. any arm i and with arbitrarily high probability, a regret of at most O T Since a lower bound of √ T is known, this says that the regret growth rate is close to optimal.
This result is new and improves on the best known bound before (T 2 3 +ε ) from [23] . In the following, we give a sketch of where are the difficulties to accomplish this and what are the contributions of this work. A key part of regret minimization algorithms is the learning rate, a parameter that balances exploration and exploitation and has to be tuned dynamically if the algorithm is supposed to perform well uniformly over time (that is, after any time T ). Dynamic learning rate however hampers the analysis, in particular for the well-studied weighted averaging schemes. It was [15] who made popular a different type of algorithm, "follow the perturbed leader" (FPL), which dates back to [11] and substantially facilitates working with dynamic learning rate. The present work builds on the FPL strategy. However, another central ingredient for bandit regret minimizers is the concept of unbiased performance estimates, which is achieved by dividing the actually observed cost by the probability of selecting the actual arm. Since this probability is not directly available for the FPL strategy (as opposed to weighted averaging schemes), we propose a 1 The results in this section are stated in order to provide an overview. The exact definitions, in particular of "long-term" and "hypothetical" regret used in Theorem 3, will be given later on in the technical parts.
way to estimate it with a Monte-Carlo sampling. Hence we need to bound the regret caused by this estimation error. In contrast, all FPL variants before were based on the "label efficient" (or rather "wasteful") way of using only the observations from designated exploration rounds. As one can show [7] , this necessarily implies a worse regret bound of order at least t 2 3 . For the analysis to go through, some steps require a finite set of decisions. We therefore need to restrict the number of arms we work with at any time and successively introduce the arms into the game.
A second contribution of this work concerns reactive environments. In this case, which is is subject of Section 3, we assume that the future behaviour of the adversary (we will also call it the environment) depends on the learner's decisions or actions, in a way, such that well chosen actions cause low cost in future. Then, there may be strong experts that propose such favourable actions. However, such a strong expert usually needs more than just one time step to act in a favourable way and then reap the benefits, we refer to this performance as the long-term performance of the expert. A special case is an expert optimal after t 0 steps, which displays optimal performance after it is followed for a fixed contiguous number t 0 of steps, from any start state of the system. We call this type of performance after t 0 time steps (that is, ignoring the initial t 0 adaptation steps) the hypothetical performance of the expert. It may be much stronger than the actual performance, which is repeatedly disturbed by other experts, after which the optimal expert needs to "recover".
An example is playing repeated prisoner's dilemma against the "tit-for-tat" adversary (see the beginning of Section 3 if you are not familiar with this game): Although in prisoner's dilemma, defecting is the dominant action, repeatedly cooperating is optimal after two steps. Thus, the long-term performance of cooperating is strong. Its hypothetical performance is even optimal (against tit-for-tat), since this is just the performance of exclusively cooperating, without disturbance from the defecting expert.
Our main tool for obtaining assertions for reactive environments is considering unbounded costs, precisely we allow the costs to grow in time. We will show (please compare again the previous footnote).
Theorem 2. Suppose that the actual costs are bounded by a function increasing in time sufficiently slowly, hence, over all time steps, the costs are unbounded. Then a regret of at most
is achievable.
Basing on Theorem 2, we will prove the following statement on the long-term and hypothetical regret in Section 3.
Theorem 3. Suppose a reactive environment. For any ε > 0, there is an algorithm which achieves, for any time T , any t 0 , and relative to the long-term performance of each expert, a regret of at most
where w i is the prior weight of the reference expert. Moreover, there is an algorithm that performs well relative to the hypothetical performance of each expert, where the regret does not exceed
Hence, if one strategy i is optimal after t 0 steps, this algorithm is performed almost optimally, with the above regret.
Reactive bandit problems have been first considered by [9] . We propose a technically much simpler way to achieve similar results, building on standard regret minimization algorithms. Moreover, while they do not state the growth rate of the regret for their algorithm explicitly, we show close to optimal growth rate. The idea is the following: Given the bounds for a regret minimization algorithm under the assumption that the instantaneous costs may slowly grow in time, we use this algorithm with uniformly bounded costs, but instead we yield the control to the respective selected expert for a gradually increasing number of time steps. In other words, we perform a change of time scale.
Motivation
Considering countably many arms or decisions or experts, straightforwardly generalizes the finite case. Moreover, the large body of literature dealing with finitely many arms, in reality only covers the special case of uniform prior weights: no prior preference is given to any decision. If we want to do otherwise and deal with nonuniform weights (for instance, we might trust some experts more than others), then even in the finite case we need techniques as proposed in this work.
There is a strong motivation for countable expert classes in the theory of computation. It is straightforward to interpret any program on some fixed universal Turing machine as an expert, by running it on the complete history of past observations (or on the part of it we decided to memorize) and interpreting its output appropriately as an action or decision. Since the set of all programs is countable, this construction naturally yields a countable expert class, and thus, combined with an appropriate regret minimization algorithm, a universal regret minimization algorithm or "universal agent".
There is a dual way to use the set of all programs on a universal Turing machine for learning, namely Bayesian learning. In fact, each program can be related to a (semi-)probability distribution, this construction is at the core of algorithmic information theory, see e.g. [18] (however it is more complicated than the direct correspondence to an expert). Then one can use the Bayes mixture over all these distributions for learning, actually it turns out that this Bayes mixture is equivalent to the a-priori probability distribution of the Turing machine. It has excellent learning properties, as first shown by Solomonoff [25] . For reactive environments, a construction of a universal agent (AIξ ) has been suggested by Hutter [12] ; however, this differs technically from the universal agent based on regret minimization constructed here.
Related work
We have already mentioned some relations of our work to others: Our regret minimization algorithm will basically solve similar problems (but with countably many arms) as does the "Exp3" algorithm for nonstochastic bandits due to Auer, Cesa-Bianchi, Freund, and Schapire [2, 3] . However, it is not based on weighted averaging schemes [19, 26, 10] , but on the follow the perturbed leader (FPL) principle [11, 15] . The first full observation FPL algorithm for countable experts classes was suggested in [13, 14] , the first bandit FPL algorithm (with finite expert class) in [20] . The results in this work build and improve on [23, 22] ; however, these papers used explicit exploration as suggested by [20] , which we abandon in this work. Actually, [20] construct a label efficient learner [6, 7] , which has a worse lower bound (t 2 3 ) on the regret than our upper bound (t 1 2 +ε ). The present work is possibly the first to consider countable decisions sets in the bandit setup. However, continuous decision spaces have been studied in [16, 17] . Moreover, [4] proposed an alternative method of using a nonuniform prior in the case of finitely many experts.
We indicated that FPL, as opposed to weighted averaging algorithms, may greatly facilitate the analysis, in particular for dynamic learning rate, which should be used if the time horizon T is not known in advance. We will now further discuss another feature of FPL: It permits the efficient treatment of geometrical online optimization problems, where the learner's decisions are linearly composed of base decisions, and it is assumed that the set of base decisions is of reasonable size, while the set of decisions is exponentially large. An example is the online shortest path problem in a graph with adversarially changing path costs. Most literature dealing with FPL actually considers this type of problem ( [15, 20] and many others).
The important issue of adaptive vs. oblivious adversary is discussed in the next subsection.
Adaptive and oblivious adversaries
In the context of game playing, it is natural to assume that the adversary is adaptive, i.e. it observes our decisions and adapts future behaviour accordingly. The other model frequently considered is that of oblivious adversary, which is equivalent to requiring that the adversary decides all cost vectors before the game starts. In the full information game, there is actually no difference in the worst case: Regret minimization strategies based on randomized sampling according to past costs have the same performance guarantees against oblivious and adaptive adversary, as shown in [14, Lemma 12] . In particular, all regret bounds are relative w.r.t. the best expert in hindsight.
In partial observation games, things are more complicated. In order to treat the adaptive adversary correctly, costs need to be modelled as a stochastic process, and there is no tool like [14, Lemma 12] which allows us to conclude from oblivious to adaptive adversary. As a consequence, many authors (e.g. [3] ) focused their exposition on oblivious adversaries. For weighted averaging learners, it is, however, not hard to see that the same regret bounds relative to each fixed expert (not w.r.t. the best expert in hindsight) hold for adaptive adversary. For FPL in contrast, this is not obvious, since the analysis crucially builds on "lazy" randomization which does not perform well for adaptive adversary. The key assertion of [22] is that still, as soon as we switch from "lazy" to usual randomization, the desired regret bounds do hold for FPL.
However, the regret against the best arm in hindsight is still a strictly stronger notion, as pointed out by [20, 8] :
T is the random variable denoting the regret relative to expert i at time T , then strictly E max i R i T > max i ER i T holds. [20] sacrifice some regret growth rate in order to prove bounds w.r.t. the best expert in hindsight. The recent and sophisticated construction in [8] achieves this goal with optimal t 1 2 growth rate for a finite expert class. In this work, we will consider adaptive adversary, and prove regret bound relative to each (fixed) expert.
Discussion
Before starting the technical presentation in the next section, we discuss our results and some open question on an informal level. What is the use of our regret minimization algorithm, and what are the new contributions of this work?
Although a regret growth rate t 1 2 +ε arbitrarily close to optimal can be achieved, the bounds seem hardly relevant for practical applications. The quantity that worries most is the 1/poly(w i ), which is exponential in the complexity k i of the reference arm's complexity and typically huge. This quantity also appears in the lower bounds [3] . Hence it is important and, to our knowledge, open so far to find special cases which do not have this problem.
Another interesting nontrivial question is the following: Are the learning properties of regret minimization algorithms really desirable? What does "good" or even "optimal" learning mean for reactive settings? For illustration, we briefly present an example from [24] , the reader can find more discussion there. Consider the repeated game of "chicken". 2 In this game, it is desirable for the learner to become the "dominant defector", i.e. to defect in the majority or even all of the cases while the opponent cooperates. Let's call an opponent "primitive" if he/she agrees to cooperate after a fixed number of consecutive defecting moves of the learner, and let's call "stubborn" if this number is high. Then reFPeL, which is the algorithm we propose for reactive environments, learns to be the dominant defector against any primitive opponent, however stubborn. On the other hand, if the opponent is some learning strategy which also tries to maximize profit and learns faster (we conducted the experiment with AIξ [12] ), then reFPeL settles for cooperating, and the opponent will be the dominant defector. Interestingly, however, AIξ would not learn to defect against a stubborn primitive opponent. Hence, already in this simple reactive setting, it is not clear which learning behavior should be really considered "good" or even "optimal".
Although this work is possibly the first to consider countable decision spaces, an assertion like our first main result Theorem 1 can be proved for the Exp3 algorithm from [3] , if the doubling trick is used and in each phase only finitely many, namely O(t 2ε ), decisions are considered. The result then follows 3 without much effort from [3, Theorem 3.1]. The result of the present paper is still interesting, as it avoids the doubling trick but uses a smooth adaptation of the learning rate, and it is based on the FPL principle, as opposed to weighted averaging. Moreover, we will present the whole analysis against an adaptive adversary.
Compared with the Exp3 variant sketched in the last paragraph, parts of the present proofs may seem complicated. As the basic FPL analysis is quite elegant [15] , this is primarily due to the fact that the explicit sampling probabilities for FPL algorithms are not known. On the other hand, they are necessary in order to get close to optimal bounds in 2 This game, also known as "Hawk and Dove", can be interpreted as follows. Two coauthors write a paper, but each tries to spend as little effort as possible. If we succeed in letting the other do the whole work, there will be no cost. On the other hand, if no one does anything, there will be no paper, this translates to high costs for both. Finally, if both decide to cooperate, both incur some costs. We chose the cost matrix as 1 0.8 0 0.5 , the learner is the column player, and choosing the first column means to defect, the second to cooperate. The opponent is the row player, whose cost matrix is the transpose, i.e. 1 0 0.8 0.5 . For example, if the player defects and the opponent cooperates, then the player has no cost, while the opponent has cost of 0.8. Hence, in the repeated game, it is "socially optimal" to take turns cooperating and defecting.
3 I am grateful to the referee who pointed this out.
the Bandit setup. Therefore, the error introduced by using estimated probabilities instead of true ones needs to be bounded, which the present work is probably the first to do. Although technically not difficult, the unbounded losses, which are also possibly a new contribution of this work, allow some nice constructions. In particular, the treatment of reactive environments can be considerably simplified relative to [9] . Moreover, we define a "universal" learner based on expert advice, which is probably the first one that has provable guarantees w.r.t. all algorithms on some universal Turing machine.
Bandits with countably many arms

Notation
The learner's task is to choose repeatedly one arm of a bandit with countably many arms. We will use the terms "arm" and "expert" and "decision" interchangeably. Each arm i ≥ 1 is assigned a weight w i ∈ (0, 1), such that i w i ≤ 1. We set k i = − log w i (and mean the natural logarithm), this is the complexity of the arm. By Kraft's inequality, the k i correspond to description lengths in "nats" for the arms, relative to some prefix code.
Our regret minimization game involves sequence c 1 , c 2 , . . . of cost vectors in time t. Each cost vector c t has countably infinite dimension, ]. The notion of regret is sufficiently important to spend an extra symbol ∆. Actually, the regret is a stochastic process developing in time, and we will be always able to give bounds on the expected regret E∆ 1:T [c A , c B ], although there are no nontrivial bounds on any of the parts of the difference, Ec A 1:T or Ec B 1:T .
The game
The following is the protocol of the nonstochastic bandit game we study: Here, the regret is measured relative to any arm i 0 . The horizon T , the time at which the game ends and regret is evaluated, is not known in advance to the learner. B t is the cost growth parameter: The costs are not, as usual, uniformly bounded in [0, 1], but in [0, B t ], where B t grows in t. As indicated in the introduction, B t will be used in order to get to the long-term regret for reactive problems in Section 3. We assume that B t is controlled by the learner. It could be also externally given, but in no case controlled by the adversary.
For simplicity, we assume the adversary to be deterministic throughout this paper. The results of this section immediately generalize to randomized adversary, as usually bounds for regret minimization algorithms do. In principle, this holds also for the results of Section 3, but the assertions regarding the time t 0 there are more difficult to state for a randomized adversary.
The algorithm FPeL
We can now define our regret minimization algorithm, follow the perturbed estimated leader (FPeL). Note that we do not need to care for explicit exploration, which is usually necessary (another algorithm that does not need explicit exploration was given by Allenberg [1] ). The intuitive reason is the following: As becomes clear when looking at the algorithm, experts which are selected can only worsen their probability of being selected again; thus our FPeL explores implicitly. This is the opposite in other algorithms like Exp3 [3] . The algorithm contains some new notation, which is explained in the subsequent paragraphs. we denote the set of experts that are active at time t. We choose the introduction times τ i such that in each time step, always a finite number of experts is active.
Algorithm FPeL
Our algorithm makes use of a sequence of learning rates η t that control the balance of exploration and exploitation, this is common in experts' algorithms. Moreover, we need denominator thresholds
bounding the denominator probabilityp
, which is used for obtaining "almost unbiased" cost estimatesĉ Each time randomness is used, it is assumed to be independent of the past randomness. Note in particular that the random vectors q are reinstantiated each time FPLsample is invoked, that is, the symbol q is repeatedly "reused", this simplifies notation. Before we start with the analysis, the reader should observe the following easy but important fact. 
Analysis
In this subsection, we will show the main technical results of this paper, ultimately arriving at the proof of Theorem 1. Similar to other work before [15, 13, 23] , the proof is accomplished by considering two "intermediate" algorithms F* and IF*. We show a sequence of regret bounds from FPeL to F*, then from F* to IF*, and finally from IF* to a fixed arm i. None of the intermediate algorithms is practically feasible within the protocol defined in Section 2.2, they are "virtual" algorithms. However, all intermediate algorithms would be feasible with additional information, and in order to facilitate the analysis, the reader should imagine that all algorithms are in fact executed the way they are defined. Before we start, we introduce one more piece of notation, the true probability p i t = P[I FPeL t = i] that FPeL selects expert i at time t (recall that this quantity is not known exactly to the learner). Our notation is recapitulated in Fig. 1 (some notation displayed there is still to be introduced).
Our main analysis until Theorem 11 proceeds in expectation, we will state a high probability bound only at the very end. However, since the high probability bound relies on martingales, we really need the analysis for the conditional expectation, this will be stated as Corollary 12. The reader familiar with conditional expectation will notice that all bounds to come are in fact proven in conditional expectation: Lemmas 5, 6 and 9 hold instantaneously at time t in conditional expectation given the past randomness, while Lemma 10 holds in conditional expectation over the charging perturbation vector q * (see (1) ) given all other randomness. It will help the reader become familiar with these concepts keeping the conditional expectations in mind.
We now introduce the two intermediate algorithms F* and IF*. F*: This algorithm proceeds exactly as FPeL and also uses identical randomization q (recall that q is reinstantiated frequently). But additionally, in the beginning of the game, it samples a single infinitely dimensional "charging perturbation vector"
, where q i * are distributed indep. exponentially, for all i.
( 
we denote F*'s selection relative to the cost perturbation vector q * . Then F* still uses the original randomization q and the decisions I , hence, all three algorithms FPeL, F* and IF* are using identical cost estimates. Recall that the intermediate algorithms are "virtual" and not actually feasible. Recall also that q * is fixed at the beginning at the game, while the vector q is "reused" each time FPLsample is invoked.
Given Lemma 5, we may analyse F* instead of FPeL. The next Lemma relates the true costs c t to the estimatesĉ t .
Lemma 6. When the denominator threshold is
, we have the following relations between c andĉ for each t ≥ 1. 
] ≤ 6ψ t B t for all experts i ∈ {t ≥ τ }.
Remark 7.
Recall that F* samples according to the perturbation q t , but is charged according to the perturbation q * . This means that F*'s expected estimated costs correctly evaluate to
That is, we need to sum over both probability distributions, and clearly, the cost is only different from zero if I We assume that p i t ≥ ψ t . If this assumption is false but we usep i t ≥ ψ t , thenp i t is an overestimate and we have to consider an additional instantaneous regret. In this case, we would have selected expert i with probability at most ψ t , therefore the case has probability at most ψ t . Consequently, as true instantaneous costs are always bounded by B t , this causes an additional instantaneous regret of at most ψ t B t .
According to the definition of the algorithm FPeL, the perturbed leader is sampled K = 16t 2 log(2
t log(ψ −1 t ) times, and a(K ) is the number of times the leader happens to be expert i. By Hoeffding's inequality, the distribution of
K is sharply peaked around its mean p i t :
therefore implies thatp i t ≤ p i t with probability at least 1 − ψ t (recall the assumption p i t ≥ ψ t ). Hence the possibility of overestimatep i t > p i t causes another additional regret of ψ t B t , which proves (i).
In order to show (ii)-(iv), we need to deal with possible underestimates. For some integer m ≥ 1, the probability
is at most
by Hoeffding's inequality. We partition the interval [ψ t , p t i ) of all possible underestimates into subintervals
, p i t and
We do not need to consider m with the property A m ∩ [ψ t , p t i ) = ∅. That is, we can restrict to m small enough that
Let M be the largest m for which this condition is satisfied, then we can easily
This follows by a simple algebraic manipulation. The claim implies (ii), because according to (4),p i t happens to be left of A m with probability at most ψ m t . Now, (iii) follows if we estimate the expectation over all A m . We have just shown that forp i t ∈ A m , we have Eĉ i t ≤ c i t + (m + 1)ψ t B t , and moreover this occurs with probability at most ψ m−1 t
. So, when passing back from the estimated to the true costs, this implies an upper bound on the additional regret of
For all other experts i not selected by FPeL, we clearly have ∆ t [ĉ i t , c i t ] = 0, hence (iii) is proven.
We now prove the step from F* to IF*, in terms of estimated costs.
Lemma 9. Provided that η t B t ≤ 1, we have
. Denote the exponential distribution by µ and integration with respect to q 1 . . . q n (n = |{t ≥ τ }|) without the ith coordinate by . . . dµ(q =i ). Moreover, for x ∈ R, let x + = max{x, 0}. Then, similarly to the proof of [14, Theorem 4] ,
, which implies λ 1:t =ĉ 1:
We use the abbreviated notation "min T ≥τ " instead of "min i:T ≥τ i ". Then, for all T ≥ 1,
can be shown by induction. It clearly holds for T = 0. For the induction step, we have to show
The inequality is obvious if
shows (10) . Rearranging terms in (9), we see
The assertion (8) then follows by taking expectations and using
The second inequality of (11) holds because τ i depends monotonically on k i , and Eq i = 1, and maximality ofĉ i 1:T for T < τ i . The second inequality of (12) can be proven by a simple application of the union bound, see [14, Lemma 1] .
We now combine the above results and derive an upper bound on the expected regret of FPeL against an adaptive adversary.
, and instantaneous bounds on the costs B t = t β . Select α, β ≥ 0 such that α 2 + β = ε. Let c t be some possibly adaptive assignment of cost vectors satisfying c t ∞ ≤ B t . Then for each expert i, we have
Proof. Set t 0 = τ i . For t < t 0 , the cost of FPeL, hence also the regret, is bounded by
. The rest for t ≥ t 0 follows by summing up all regret bounds in (this is the correct order) Lemmas 6(i), 9, 10, and 6(iii), observing that |{t ≥ τ }| ≤ t α .
The leading constant 31 of the (lower order) term T 1 2 +ε is not sharp; it stems from the necessity of taking into account the cost estimation error several times during the analysis.
In order to complete the proof of Theorem 1, we need a high probability bound. We will obtain this from Azuma's inequality. However, in order to apply Azuma's inequality, we first need to slightly generalize Theorem 11 to conditional expectations. Let A t be the sigma algebra generated by all randomness up to time t, and consider E(X |A t−1 ), which is the conditional expectation of some random variable X w.r.t. the sigma algebra A t−1 . The sequence (A t ) t≥1 obviously is a filtration of sigma algebras.
Corollary 12.
Under the conditions of Theorem 11, we have
Proof. We need to check that the Lemmata shown so far also hold in conditional expectation. This is easy to see in all cases. Note in particular that Lemma 10 has been proven for any fixed randomness, where the expectation was taken only over the charging perturbation q * . Now, the required high probability bound can be obtained from Azuma's inequality.
Lemma 13. For each T ≥ 1 and δ ∈ (0, 1), with probability at least 1 − δ we have
Proof. It is straightforward that the sequence of random variables
is a martingale w.r.t. the filtration A t generated by the past randomness, since
holds. Its differences are bounded: |X t − X t−1 | ≤ B t . Hence, it follows from Azuma's inequality (see e.g. [21] ) that the probability that X T exceeds some λ > 0 is bounded by 2 exp − and learning rate η t = t − 1 2 −ε . Then both the expected and high probability regret of FPeL relative to any arm i and at any time T can be bounded:
and
with probability
Moreover, FPeL is asymptotically optimal w.r.t. each expert, i.e. for all i, The asymptotic optimality is sometimes termed Hannan-consistency, in particular if the limit equals zero. We only show the upper bound.
Proof. Expected and high probability bounds follow from Theorem 11 and Corollary 12 combined with Lemma 13.
Hence, only the asymptotic optimality remains to be shown. Since P 
Reactive environments
The FPeL algorithm considered so far performs well relative to any expert. In this section, we show an easy way to possibly improve the performance of some experts (and thus also of FPeL) for a broad class of tasks, namely for reactive environments.
The reader is asked to think of broader learning tasks than just pulling the arm of a bandit repeatedly in this section, such as an agent which learns and acts in some environment. Also, the experts could be possibly complex procedures, performing some complicated computation and thereafter suggesting some decision or action. On the technical level, however, nothing changes: The learner repeatedly selects an expert and follows its advice.
As a motivating example, consider the repeated "prisoner's dilemma" against the tit-for-tat 4 strategy (this motivating example was also considered in [9] ). If we use two strategies as experts, namely "always cooperate" and "always defect", then it is clear that always cooperating will have the best long-term reward. However, a standard expert advice or bandit learning algorithm will not discover this, since it compares only the costs in one step, which are always lower for the defecting expert (defecting is the "dominant action"). To put it differently, minimizing shortterm regret is not at all a good idea here. E.g. always defecting has no regret, while for always cooperating the regret grows linearly. But this is only the case for short-term regret, i.e. if we restrict ourselves to time intervals of length one. Prisoner's dilemma is an example for a broader class of reactive online decision problems where evaluating the long-term performance renders some experts significantly stronger. In particular, there is an expert that is optimal after t 0 time steps, namely the cooperating expert.
Definition 15. (i) From the perspective of the learner, an online decision problem is just a game as defined in Section 2.2. However, we do not assume here that the goal of the adversary is necessarily maximizing the learner's regret. (ii) We say an online decision problem to be reactive if the learner's actions impact on the adversary's behaviour in future. We are particularly interested in situations where the learner can benefit from well-chosen decisions in the past. (iii) The T -long-term performance of an expert i is its cost c i T 0 +1 :T 0 +T for T time steps, starting from time T 0 , if this expert i plays all the time from T 0 on, no other experts are allowed to interfere. We say that the long-term performance of the experts is evaluated, if for each T , from some time in the game on, each expert invoked is followed for T time steps or more. (iv) The hypothetical cost or performance of an expert i after t 0 time steps is its long-term cost c i T 1 +1 :T 1 +T , where it plays all the time from T 0 on, and the performance is evaluated from time T 1 = T 0 + t 0 on (so the initial t 0 steps are ignored). An expert is strong or even optimal after t 0 steps if its hypothetical cost after t 0 steps is low or even optimal, starting from any state of the environment. Here, the notions "low" and "optimal" depend on what is achievable for the respective environment.
For instance, in the prisoner's dilemma, where the opponent plays tit-for-tat, cooperating is optimal after two steps. If the learner chooses to defect in one round, the cooperative expert needs two contiguous rounds to recover, i.e. to get the opponent to cooperate again.
Recall from Section 2.2 that the adversarial (environment) is assumed to be deterministic throughout this work, which makes it possible to restrict to a fixed number t 0 of time steps. Also, we left the notions of strength and optimality unspecified. Using more technical tools than we are willing to afford in this presentation, it is possible to treat stochastic environments, and to unambiguously define the optimal performance for a very broad class of environments (the "value"). Then, quantitative bounds for the regret minimization algorithms can be derived accordingly, which hold for a broad class of Markov decision processes (and even apply to POMDPs, provided that at least one of the experts suggests optimal actions). We leave the details to the interested reader.
The algorithm reFPeL. It is surprisingly easy to state an algorithm which performs well relative to the long-term performance and the even hypothetical performance of any expert after t 0 steps. We just have to make sure that the long-term performance of all experts is evaluated. We therefore define the algorithm reFPeL, reactive follow the perturbed estimated leader, as follows: Take the algorithm FPeL from Section 2.3 and rename the learner's scale from t tot. Then, in each time stept, give the control to a selected expert for periods of increasing length Bt . The costs at the learner's new time scalet are defined asc it = t (t)+B t −1 t=t (t) 
at the horizon time T . Hence, if an expert i is strong or even optimal after t 0 time steps, the same holds for reFPeL with the above regret (14) . Also, reFPeL is asymptotically optimal relative to the hypothetical costs.
Proof. On the learner's time scalet, we have the regret of expert i's actual performance w.r.t. its hypothetical performance is at mostt · t 0 . Since t is of ordert Since we can handle countably infinite expert classes, we may specify a universal experts algorithm. To this aim, let expert i be derived from the ith (valid) program prog i on some fixed universal Turing machine. The ith program can be well-defined, e.g. by representing programs as binary strings and lexicographically ordering them [12] . Before the expert is consulted, the relevant input, consisting e.g. of the complete history of observations, is written to the input tape of the corresponding program. If the program halts, an appropriate part of the output is interpreted as the expert's recommendation. E.g. if the decision is binary, then the first bit suffices. (If the program does not halt, we may go for well-definedness; just fill its output tape with zeros, see the next paragraph for the computability issue.) Each expert is assigned a prior weight by w i = 2 −length(prog i ) , where length(prog i ) is the length of the corresponding program and we assume the program tape to be binary. This construction parallels the definition of Solomonoff's universal prior [25] .
Corollary 18. If reFPeL is used together with a universal expert class as specified in the preceding paragraph, then it displays long-term performance asymptotically at least as well as any computable strategy i. The upper bound on the regret growth is exponential in the complexity k i and proportional to t 1 2 +ε (against the actual performance) or t 4 5 (against the hypothetical performance).
Note that our universal learner is not computable, since we cannot check if the computation of an expert halts. (This is just like other universal learners, e.g. AIξ [12] .) On the other hand, if used with computable experts, the algorithm is computationally feasible (at each time t we need to consider only finitely many experts). Moreover, it is easy to impose an additional constraint on the computation time of each expert and abort the expert's computation after C t operations on the Turing machine. We may choose some (possibly rapidly) growing function C t , e.g. C t = 2 t . The resulting learner is fully computable and has small regret with respect to all resource bounded strategies.
